HACKED! The evolution of Private Sector Cyberwar in the current Ukraine conflict.
Firstly, with this conflict not even 12 months old, its important we clearly state one thing. Historians, analysts and military tacticians at large will dissect nearly every part of this conflict with the intent of drawing out as much information and intelligence as possible however this will have to be done in the future, when some form of peace has been obtained. Assessing current combat strength, effectiveness and ability to conduct operations unimpeded on Ukrainian soil is well beyond the scope of this article. We’ll leave that bit to the historians, today we’ll purely be discussing the Ukrainian response to those initial days and what was done to assist to transitioning Ukraine from a force under pressure and near collapse due to enemy invasions to a first rate fighting force, using tactics weapons and innovations that any tier 1 military can be proud of.
As we approach the 12 month anniversary of the “special military operation”, that anyone else would call a war, we’d like to discuss a few things that have evolved since February 2022. But first, a quick rehash in case you’ve been living under a rock.
As we know, after a long and pronounced buildup in the weeks prior including a heavy disinformation campaign that played on the fact this was a “training exercise”, on Feb 24 2022 the Russian Federation conducted an unethical, illegal, and immoral “special military operation” (read WAR), initiated under the guise of implementing Ukrainian de nazification. Due to no shortage of incorrect myths and information about Russian force projection and combat strength, the falling of Kyiv at that point was taken as a given, Ukrainian leadership was not expected to stand its ground, and the Ukrainian military was expected to be unable to project force and provide equipment at the levels needed to deter and repel Russian aggression. It didn’t look good for Ukraine at this point. However, this soon changed on the back of 3 directly relevant incidents in the early stages of the “Special Military Operation”, that shook and destroyed the myth of Russian military “strength” and turned the tables early on in the conflict. There is no guarantee Ukraine will be victorious in this conflict, but they have fought strongly for their land and have transitioned in to a deadly, effective fighting force, killing occupiers en masse and retaking several areas lost over the course of the invasion. They have projected force and defended their homeland and should retain pride in their ability to continue to maintain this.
The first indication all was not as it seemed re Russian military strength was just after the initial invasion. when an armored convoy stretching along over 17 miles of road and including thousands of armored vehicles SAM systems and tanks, all organized to take Kyiv in the initial stages of the invasions went stationary for a number of days. With rumors of corruption within Russian forces, fuel was swapped for food, anything was swapped for vodka and for a while there even the Russian military wasn’t sure if they were conducting an invasion or a training operation. Due to this and other factors, the convoy remained stalled, with hundreds of vehicles damaged and lost, by weapons including Javelin and NLAW and sometimes, nothing more than bad weather as well as many lost and outright stolen by a whole bunch of annoyed Ukrainian farmers with tractors. Nice work guys.
Russian might turned out to be more like Russia lite, as Russia shifted from being the worlds 2nd most powerful army to being the 2nd most powerful army in Ukraine. Although, with multiple claimed tanks and a devastating ability to wield a John Deere, Ukrainian farmers are hot on the heels of the Russian military, chasing that number two position hard as well. Give them time, they’ll get there. Also briefly while we’re here this is a brutal reminder paid in blood by Russia that “talk” is cheap and can only go so far. You can sure help a victory along with propaganda, but will remain unable to hold and maintain victory on propaganda strength along. Eventually lies and deception return to the surface, usually at an extremely inconvenient time. People forgot that bit.
The second issue came directly from Russian inability to project combat Air Power effectively in the early stages of the conflict. This inhibited the ability of the Russians to obtain vitally needed air superiority and meant that they were unable to cover ground troops as needed, with losses as expected instantly causing further issues with morale, and busting the myth of the Russian bears strength wide open. Its worth noting here that entire operations stalled, as the Ukrainians showed incredible adaptability, even taking out their own critical infrastructure when needed on occasion to deny the aggressor its use. It is extremely relevant to note that as we approach the one year anniversary of the invasion that as the invader and aggressor, Russian has STILL failed to maintain any form of relevant air superiority and as such has lost tens of thousands of crack troops over the conflict for no other reason than a complete inability to project Air Power and control airspace. Probably the most well known examples of this would be the shoot down of a transport plane carrying troops in the early stages of the invasion causing the loss of the aircraft with all souls on board.
Its also worth pointing out that this incompetence has lead to repeated and sustained losses, mostly due to poor operating procedures and implementing procedures that no professional western army would tolerate. Hundreds of soldiers in a room next to an ammo dump with no distribution or reduction of assets to make targeting more difficult is a poor idea. In fact, we’d hypothesize that with hundreds of Russian troops parking themselves in an room next to an ammo dump and subsequently applying little to no EMCON strategy, the application of HIMARS to this situation really leads to only one inevitable outcome.
The third and most relevant issue to this is the impact of the Ukrainian military and political leadership, and how this was used to raise morale, source military hardware from allies and provide a clear middle finger to the leadership on the other side. Near ridiculed for his past as a comedian, and with a Russian analysis expecting him to turn flee and abandon his people at the first opportunity, the actions and attitude of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy was crucial in inspiring everyday Ukrainians to resist Russian aggression in the early stages of the war. Actively hunted by crack Russian teams through Kyiv in the early stages of the conflict, while the invasion force was stalled outside the city, Zelenskyy stood firm with his people, constantly on the move, issuing press releases, inspiring his people to take up arms and continue to fight for their independence against the occupiers despite ever increasing hardships.
As Russian president Vladimir Putin hid in his underground bunker, evading the eyes of the press, Russian military and the Russian population at large, Zelenskyy stood up, working the phone overtime, receiving foreign leaders in Kyiv and actively fighting the Russian attempts to discredit his character as well as take his life. He leaned into his past as a comic, using his ability to connect with people to bring both countries and people together, and inspiring his own people to continue the fight, despite continuing hardships caused by RU war crimes. With this, the weapons and support of allies steadily began to increase and with it, Ukrainian results on the battlefield
After dropping the now legendary line “I need ammo, not a ride” after being given the option of evacuation, the president mobilized his people, and the people stood up, defending places like Bahkmut, Azovstal, and Mariupol to the bitter end, in extreme conditions often with limited power and communications facilities due to increasing Shahed and other missile strikes on civilian infrastructure. Whilst not always the victors in every battle “i need ammo not a ride” says a lot about the character of a leader and their beliefs in their public institutions, history and national sovereignty. One president, endlessly in a bunker designed for nuclear warfare alone and distrustful of his political and military leadership, another making daily press releases, showing the flag to his people and using his ability to bring people together to stoke the fires of western resentment of the Russian invasion. With this in play, the weapons continued to flow, the most crucial of which was the initial High Mobility Artillery Rocket System delivery (HIMARS for short). HIMARS, even without the boost of its long range ATACMS system was devastating to Russian military assets. With the destruction of enemy Armour, Aircraft, ammunition dumps and tens of thousands of enemy troops, the integration of HIMARS firing GMLRS rockets began to shift the balance of power within the conflict right away, grinding away at the Russian military and causing them to throw thousands of troops at the problem, with little change in outcome other than more needlessly killed Russians. When does it end?
Which president hits the feels? The one mobilizing his people to fight for their homeland? Or the one senselessly sending his people to die in a foreign land in a war of conquest as he hides in said bunker? Does any one recall the Russian Christmas display last year? The one with Putin and the priest in a church with no one else. Like sitting at one of those giant tables alone, its a lonely old life for a Dictator sometimes. President Zelenskyy was entirely accurate when stating the consequences of this war have the potential to be felt around the world for decades to come if the world refuses to push back against aggression and territorial conquest. The age of conquest is over, and this must be enforced for the sake of the international world order and our ongoing reliance on the rule of law.
But now? The interesting bits. After experiencing a huge number of wiper, malware and DDOS attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure in the build up to the war, now, with boots on the ground it was time for an reset. On the 26th of Feb, Digital Transformations minister Mykhailo Federov announced that Ukraine would be building up an IT “army” using private sector hackers, observers, programmers and analysts. Within hours of the announcement, tens of thousands of hackers and security specialists heard Ukraine’s call and immediately responded, providing resources, intelligence and hardware to project cyber force into the Russian federation. The IT army despite comprising nearly all civilians most of which that had no military combat experience whatsoever has been highly organized, delegating tasks, gathering intelligence and attacking Russian assets with immediate success in the early stages. In perpetuating its invasion of Ukraine, Russia also garnered the attention of Hacktivist group Anonymous, as well as hundreds of lone wolf hackers, all of whom used a mixture of wiper, malware / ransomware and denial of service attacks to interfere with Russian traffic, and eroding the efficiency of Russian logistics, having more effect on the ability to provide weapons and manpower to assist at the front.
The IT Army is controlled via telegram group and a direct website, coordinating strikes for peak efficiency and raising awareness and requesting resources to assist the IT army in coordinating its efforts. Its also rumored certain western hackers and Intelligence Branches have been involved in the Cyber realm, however confirmation of these types of things is not expected to be given until after the war, if at all. Cyber is like surveillance in the sense there is a mystique involved in this which comes with an extremely high motivation to keep information and systems secure and offensive belligerents and capabilities unknown.
So, what have they attacked and how are they doing it? Well, in the interests of OpSec we wont go too far into this. The conflict is by no means finished and Ukraine needs every edge it can get, so providing information and attack methods is inappropriate at this stage of the conflict whilst things remain dynamic. We can however safely disclose, that so far its been predominantly Military Targets only, and pursuing targets that will affect 2 things. Russian ability to maintain logistical lines, and Russian ability to continue to raise revenue within the Russian federation with the intent of perpetuating this conflict even longer. So we’ve had attacks on Gazprom, ATOL Da-trans, Sbis OFD and more, using a mixture of DDOS attacks and high end social engineering to achieve their desired outcomes. Coordination within the IT army is key to bypassing load balancing and being able to send as much traffic as possible with in the area to raise the chance of success. However we are still seeing a high level of lone wolf attacks, some by internally coordinated groups such as Anonymous, but there are also many solo lone wolves hacking CCTV cameras and archiving thousands of hours of footage. This can later be used to track civilians, military units and military assets. These lone wolves, operating silently and discreetly to their own terms of engagement have caused chaos at various parts of the conflict and gathered intelligence that has been vital to proving instances of Russian war crimes.
One interesting point in regards to this discussion, is despite the addition of a private sector hacking army nearing a quarter of a million members strong (at unknown activity levels) is the status of these hackers within the conflict and whether they are and should be deemed as combatants or not under international rules of warfare. Warfare has its own rules of engagement and operating conditions which vary from country to country and change with each scenario. Previously combatants were easily identifiable, and usually maintained with in a zone of operations. With the evolution of war and the Cyber army at large, we now have scenarios where someone can participate, with effect from the other side of the world, thousands of miles away. The other question around these lone wolves is the status of their actions within their home country. Does a Kiwi hacker drag New Zealand into the war simply by being involved? Is the application of kinetic force on a nation state warranted or justified because a lone wolf perpetuated an attack and another nation state responds. This is the very problem with the unknowns of future warfare, the questions revolving around combatant status and private sector attacks are unable to be easily resolved and must be answered over time. Like drone warfare, the question of this remains in the early stages of infancy and will evolve into the future.
We’ll close out by having a quick chat about what to do if you’ve been reading this article and have decided to tag in and assist. Firstly, all individuals should check their status at home first, as some countries make it directly illegal to engage in Cyber attacks, even if it is part of an ethically justified war. This is not something to be perpetuated on a whim, with a lack of understanding of the overall situation. Things like this have real life consequences, regardless of where you are in the world. Beyond that however, with the 12 month anniversary of the attack fast approaching, Ukraine has not sat idle in defending its territory and has shown initiative in how it evolves in the battle space time and time again and adapts its methods to get the best results from its resources.
At this point in the conflict, things have been streamlined with such ruthless efficiency that even those with a low level technical background are easily able to contribute to the war effort for Ukraine. Extremely active on telegram (somewhat ironic using a Russian platform to coordinate this, but whatever) and using all resources as best as possible, Ukraine continues to mount Cyber attacks against Russian assets time and time again. Using automation, and coordinated attacks to assist those with a lower technical capability to contribute, these resources have immediately been leveraged to assist in repelling Russian aggression. But what does this mean in terms of contributing? Firstly, if you’re interested you can check out the IT army main page which is found at itarmy.com.au or alternately you can receive updates via telegram using the channel t.me/itarmyofukraine2022
Ukraine has continued to be extremely vocal in terms of what assets it feels it needs to secure its territory and outright win this conflict, and the cyber army has been no different. Resources and manpower are probably the two most understood issues at this point. If you’d like to go a step further and actively contribute then you should reach out via telegram or via the it army page and verbalize your interest. If you’re not willing to be that direct however would still like to assist you can donate or delegate Virtual Machines or Cloud resources to Ukraine and let them deal with it. Hosted cloud resources, have been vital in allowing continuity within the electronic area of battle and continue to be critically important in maintaining the upper hand and has also been used in a limited capacity to backup civilian infrastructure, working around cruise missile strikes and relieving the damage done by power losses.
However if you’re keen to get your hands dirty (and have assessed the risk in doing so) then you have the following options available to you. Its important here to note that UA is machine agnostic, they’ll take whatever resources you’re able to provide! Before we give you this information though, we’d like to remind you that much of the success experienced by UA in this arena is due to coordination of resources, along with regular feedback and updates. If you are involved, the best thing you can do is coordinate this action with UA or other IT army members to ensure the impact of the attack on the infrastructure is involved is as effective as it can possibly be. You can do this by the following methods:
1. Visit the UA IT army website and either attack targets directly or nominate targets for others to attack. You can do this via the section to nominate targets, which is regularly used to receive intelligence. Yellow box top corner, see the screenshot for details
2. Donate server power or cloud resources via the same website.
3. Use telegram and automated attack via the UA DDOS attack bot. This bot will coordinate attacks on servers for you, log statistics and even give you an efficiency ranking to let you know how you’ve performed. Find the bot at telegram username @gov_ddos_ru_bot and follow the instructions to run and activate. DDOS Bot for automation on Telegram
4. Gather intelligence on equipment and troop movements via osint and spot for UA. Open source intelligence on troop movements was critical in exposing the lies behind MH17, and continues to be vitally important in the current conflict tracking machines, manpower, and war crimes.
5. If you’re a hosting or VPN provider, UA would love to hear from you as well.
6. And lastly if you are new to IT or have literally no clue on how to participate in a meaningful way then several highly experienced hackers already have your back, as they’ve been providing training and ready to go scripts that are exactly that. Useful. The website Hackers-Arise has plenty of information for you including a ready to go Z-map script that may still be useful, for those who like to live dangerously. Do a google search for Hackers-Arise and you’ll find your way easily enough.
Also, just a quick reminder that scams are everywhere in life and on the front line of a conflict zone is no different to anywhere else in the world. Ukraine has been open with what it needs in the way of resources and where money can be legitimately donated should you chose that option.. With that said, be extremely wary of donations of any shape or form that are being solicited outside of the usual verified avenues.
So there you have it! A somewhat long article on the evolution of Cyber war in 2022/3 but one that remains interesting due to its use of technology and the ethical complications in regards to lone wolf attacks. As we stated during the initial write up much of whats occurred in this battle space is outside the scope of being easily assessed now. Like any combat situation, historians and tacticians the world over will analyze, critique and review this for many years to come. However, shining a light on it briefly now to expose some of these more interesting complications as well as giving Ukraine request for resources more air time can be done now, prior to the end of the conflict and before historians involve themselves.
And we’d be remiss writing any article touching on the European conflict without throwing in that one little line, repeated many times over the past 12 months by many people committed to the cause…..Slava Ukraini. Personally, we think liberty is at stake which for Ukraine, should mean F16’s, Tomahawks and GLSDB, preferably as quickly as possible.
As we approach the 12 month anniversary of the “special military operation”, that anyone else would call a war, we’d like to discuss a few things that have evolved since February 2022. But first, a quick rehash in case you’ve been living under a rock.
As we know, after a long and pronounced buildup in the weeks prior including a heavy disinformation campaign that played on the fact this was a “training exercise”, on Feb 24 2022 the Russian Federation conducted an unethical, illegal, and immoral “special military operation” (read WAR), initiated under the guise of implementing Ukrainian de nazification. Due to no shortage of incorrect myths and information about Russian force projection and combat strength, the falling of Kyiv at that point was taken as a given, Ukrainian leadership was not expected to stand its ground, and the Ukrainian military was expected to be unable to project force and provide equipment at the levels needed to deter and repel Russian aggression. It didn’t look good for Ukraine at this point. However, this soon changed on the back of 3 directly relevant incidents in the early stages of the “Special Military Operation”, that shook and destroyed the myth of Russian military “strength” and turned the tables early on in the conflict. There is no guarantee Ukraine will be victorious in this conflict, but they have fought strongly for their land and have transitioned in to a deadly, effective fighting force, killing occupiers en masse and retaking several areas lost over the course of the invasion. They have projected force and defended their homeland and should retain pride in their ability to continue to maintain this.
The first indication all was not as it seemed re Russian military strength was just after the initial invasion. when an armored convoy stretching along over 17 miles of road and including thousands of armored vehicles SAM systems and tanks, all organized to take Kyiv in the initial stages of the invasions went stationary for a number of days. With rumors of corruption within Russian forces, fuel was swapped for food, anything was swapped for vodka and for a while there even the Russian military wasn’t sure if they were conducting an invasion or a training operation. Due to this and other factors, the convoy remained stalled, with hundreds of vehicles damaged and lost, by weapons including Javelin and NLAW and sometimes, nothing more than bad weather as well as many lost and outright stolen by a whole bunch of annoyed Ukrainian farmers with tractors. Nice work guys.
Russian might turned out to be more like Russia lite, as Russia shifted from being the worlds 2nd most powerful army to being the 2nd most powerful army in Ukraine. Although, with multiple claimed tanks and a devastating ability to wield a John Deere, Ukrainian farmers are hot on the heels of the Russian military, chasing that number two position hard as well. Give them time, they’ll get there. Also briefly while we’re here this is a brutal reminder paid in blood by Russia that “talk” is cheap and can only go so far. You can sure help a victory along with propaganda, but will remain unable to hold and maintain victory on propaganda strength along. Eventually lies and deception return to the surface, usually at an extremely inconvenient time. People forgot that bit.
The second issue came directly from Russian inability to project combat Air Power effectively in the early stages of the conflict. This inhibited the ability of the Russians to obtain vitally needed air superiority and meant that they were unable to cover ground troops as needed, with losses as expected instantly causing further issues with morale, and busting the myth of the Russian bears strength wide open. Its worth noting here that entire operations stalled, as the Ukrainians showed incredible adaptability, even taking out their own critical infrastructure when needed on occasion to deny the aggressor its use. It is extremely relevant to note that as we approach the one year anniversary of the invasion that as the invader and aggressor, Russian has STILL failed to maintain any form of relevant air superiority and as such has lost tens of thousands of crack troops over the conflict for no other reason than a complete inability to project Air Power and control airspace. Probably the most well known examples of this would be the shoot down of a transport plane carrying troops in the early stages of the invasion causing the loss of the aircraft with all souls on board.
Its also worth pointing out that this incompetence has lead to repeated and sustained losses, mostly due to poor operating procedures and implementing procedures that no professional western army would tolerate. Hundreds of soldiers in a room next to an ammo dump with no distribution or reduction of assets to make targeting more difficult is a poor idea. In fact, we’d hypothesize that with hundreds of Russian troops parking themselves in an room next to an ammo dump and subsequently applying little to no EMCON strategy, the application of HIMARS to this situation really leads to only one inevitable outcome.
The third and most relevant issue to this is the impact of the Ukrainian military and political leadership, and how this was used to raise morale, source military hardware from allies and provide a clear middle finger to the leadership on the other side. Near ridiculed for his past as a comedian, and with a Russian analysis expecting him to turn flee and abandon his people at the first opportunity, the actions and attitude of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy was crucial in inspiring everyday Ukrainians to resist Russian aggression in the early stages of the war. Actively hunted by crack Russian teams through Kyiv in the early stages of the conflict, while the invasion force was stalled outside the city, Zelenskyy stood firm with his people, constantly on the move, issuing press releases, inspiring his people to take up arms and continue to fight for their independence against the occupiers despite ever increasing hardships.
As Russian president Vladimir Putin hid in his underground bunker, evading the eyes of the press, Russian military and the Russian population at large, Zelenskyy stood up, working the phone overtime, receiving foreign leaders in Kyiv and actively fighting the Russian attempts to discredit his character as well as take his life. He leaned into his past as a comic, using his ability to connect with people to bring both countries and people together, and inspiring his own people to continue the fight, despite continuing hardships caused by RU war crimes. With this, the weapons and support of allies steadily began to increase and with it, Ukrainian results on the battlefield
After dropping the now legendary line “I need ammo, not a ride” after being given the option of evacuation, the president mobilized his people, and the people stood up, defending places like Bahkmut, Azovstal, and Mariupol to the bitter end, in extreme conditions often with limited power and communications facilities due to increasing Shahed and other missile strikes on civilian infrastructure. Whilst not always the victors in every battle “i need ammo not a ride” says a lot about the character of a leader and their beliefs in their public institutions, history and national sovereignty. One president, endlessly in a bunker designed for nuclear warfare alone and distrustful of his political and military leadership, another making daily press releases, showing the flag to his people and using his ability to bring people together to stoke the fires of western resentment of the Russian invasion. With this in play, the weapons continued to flow, the most crucial of which was the initial High Mobility Artillery Rocket System delivery (HIMARS for short). HIMARS, even without the boost of its long range ATACMS system was devastating to Russian military assets. With the destruction of enemy Armour, Aircraft, ammunition dumps and tens of thousands of enemy troops, the integration of HIMARS firing GMLRS rockets began to shift the balance of power within the conflict right away, grinding away at the Russian military and causing them to throw thousands of troops at the problem, with little change in outcome other than more needlessly killed Russians. When does it end?
Which president hits the feels? The one mobilizing his people to fight for their homeland? Or the one senselessly sending his people to die in a foreign land in a war of conquest as he hides in said bunker? Does any one recall the Russian Christmas display last year? The one with Putin and the priest in a church with no one else. Like sitting at one of those giant tables alone, its a lonely old life for a Dictator sometimes. President Zelenskyy was entirely accurate when stating the consequences of this war have the potential to be felt around the world for decades to come if the world refuses to push back against aggression and territorial conquest. The age of conquest is over, and this must be enforced for the sake of the international world order and our ongoing reliance on the rule of law.
But now? The interesting bits. After experiencing a huge number of wiper, malware and DDOS attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure in the build up to the war, now, with boots on the ground it was time for an reset. On the 26th of Feb, Digital Transformations minister Mykhailo Federov announced that Ukraine would be building up an IT “army” using private sector hackers, observers, programmers and analysts. Within hours of the announcement, tens of thousands of hackers and security specialists heard Ukraine’s call and immediately responded, providing resources, intelligence and hardware to project cyber force into the Russian federation. The IT army despite comprising nearly all civilians most of which that had no military combat experience whatsoever has been highly organized, delegating tasks, gathering intelligence and attacking Russian assets with immediate success in the early stages. In perpetuating its invasion of Ukraine, Russia also garnered the attention of Hacktivist group Anonymous, as well as hundreds of lone wolf hackers, all of whom used a mixture of wiper, malware / ransomware and denial of service attacks to interfere with Russian traffic, and eroding the efficiency of Russian logistics, having more effect on the ability to provide weapons and manpower to assist at the front.
The IT Army is controlled via telegram group and a direct website, coordinating strikes for peak efficiency and raising awareness and requesting resources to assist the IT army in coordinating its efforts. Its also rumored certain western hackers and Intelligence Branches have been involved in the Cyber realm, however confirmation of these types of things is not expected to be given until after the war, if at all. Cyber is like surveillance in the sense there is a mystique involved in this which comes with an extremely high motivation to keep information and systems secure and offensive belligerents and capabilities unknown.
So, what have they attacked and how are they doing it? Well, in the interests of OpSec we wont go too far into this. The conflict is by no means finished and Ukraine needs every edge it can get, so providing information and attack methods is inappropriate at this stage of the conflict whilst things remain dynamic. We can however safely disclose, that so far its been predominantly Military Targets only, and pursuing targets that will affect 2 things. Russian ability to maintain logistical lines, and Russian ability to continue to raise revenue within the Russian federation with the intent of perpetuating this conflict even longer. So we’ve had attacks on Gazprom, ATOL Da-trans, Sbis OFD and more, using a mixture of DDOS attacks and high end social engineering to achieve their desired outcomes. Coordination within the IT army is key to bypassing load balancing and being able to send as much traffic as possible with in the area to raise the chance of success. However we are still seeing a high level of lone wolf attacks, some by internally coordinated groups such as Anonymous, but there are also many solo lone wolves hacking CCTV cameras and archiving thousands of hours of footage. This can later be used to track civilians, military units and military assets. These lone wolves, operating silently and discreetly to their own terms of engagement have caused chaos at various parts of the conflict and gathered intelligence that has been vital to proving instances of Russian war crimes.
One interesting point in regards to this discussion, is despite the addition of a private sector hacking army nearing a quarter of a million members strong (at unknown activity levels) is the status of these hackers within the conflict and whether they are and should be deemed as combatants or not under international rules of warfare. Warfare has its own rules of engagement and operating conditions which vary from country to country and change with each scenario. Previously combatants were easily identifiable, and usually maintained with in a zone of operations. With the evolution of war and the Cyber army at large, we now have scenarios where someone can participate, with effect from the other side of the world, thousands of miles away. The other question around these lone wolves is the status of their actions within their home country. Does a Kiwi hacker drag New Zealand into the war simply by being involved? Is the application of kinetic force on a nation state warranted or justified because a lone wolf perpetuated an attack and another nation state responds. This is the very problem with the unknowns of future warfare, the questions revolving around combatant status and private sector attacks are unable to be easily resolved and must be answered over time. Like drone warfare, the question of this remains in the early stages of infancy and will evolve into the future.
We’ll close out by having a quick chat about what to do if you’ve been reading this article and have decided to tag in and assist. Firstly, all individuals should check their status at home first, as some countries make it directly illegal to engage in Cyber attacks, even if it is part of an ethically justified war. This is not something to be perpetuated on a whim, with a lack of understanding of the overall situation. Things like this have real life consequences, regardless of where you are in the world. Beyond that however, with the 12 month anniversary of the attack fast approaching, Ukraine has not sat idle in defending its territory and has shown initiative in how it evolves in the battle space time and time again and adapts its methods to get the best results from its resources.
At this point in the conflict, things have been streamlined with such ruthless efficiency that even those with a low level technical background are easily able to contribute to the war effort for Ukraine. Extremely active on telegram (somewhat ironic using a Russian platform to coordinate this, but whatever) and using all resources as best as possible, Ukraine continues to mount Cyber attacks against Russian assets time and time again. Using automation, and coordinated attacks to assist those with a lower technical capability to contribute, these resources have immediately been leveraged to assist in repelling Russian aggression. But what does this mean in terms of contributing? Firstly, if you’re interested you can check out the IT army main page which is found at itarmy.com.au or alternately you can receive updates via telegram using the channel t.me/itarmyofukraine2022
Ukraine has continued to be extremely vocal in terms of what assets it feels it needs to secure its territory and outright win this conflict, and the cyber army has been no different. Resources and manpower are probably the two most understood issues at this point. If you’d like to go a step further and actively contribute then you should reach out via telegram or via the it army page and verbalize your interest. If you’re not willing to be that direct however would still like to assist you can donate or delegate Virtual Machines or Cloud resources to Ukraine and let them deal with it. Hosted cloud resources, have been vital in allowing continuity within the electronic area of battle and continue to be critically important in maintaining the upper hand and has also been used in a limited capacity to backup civilian infrastructure, working around cruise missile strikes and relieving the damage done by power losses.
However if you’re keen to get your hands dirty (and have assessed the risk in doing so) then you have the following options available to you. Its important here to note that UA is machine agnostic, they’ll take whatever resources you’re able to provide! Before we give you this information though, we’d like to remind you that much of the success experienced by UA in this arena is due to coordination of resources, along with regular feedback and updates. If you are involved, the best thing you can do is coordinate this action with UA or other IT army members to ensure the impact of the attack on the infrastructure is involved is as effective as it can possibly be. You can do this by the following methods:
1. Visit the UA IT army website and either attack targets directly or nominate targets for others to attack. You can do this via the section to nominate targets, which is regularly used to receive intelligence. Yellow box top corner, see the screenshot for details
2. Donate server power or cloud resources via the same website.
3. Use telegram and automated attack via the UA DDOS attack bot. This bot will coordinate attacks on servers for you, log statistics and even give you an efficiency ranking to let you know how you’ve performed. Find the bot at telegram username @gov_ddos_ru_bot and follow the instructions to run and activate. DDOS Bot for automation on Telegram
4. Gather intelligence on equipment and troop movements via osint and spot for UA. Open source intelligence on troop movements was critical in exposing the lies behind MH17, and continues to be vitally important in the current conflict tracking machines, manpower, and war crimes.
5. If you’re a hosting or VPN provider, UA would love to hear from you as well.
6. And lastly if you are new to IT or have literally no clue on how to participate in a meaningful way then several highly experienced hackers already have your back, as they’ve been providing training and ready to go scripts that are exactly that. Useful. The website Hackers-Arise has plenty of information for you including a ready to go Z-map script that may still be useful, for those who like to live dangerously. Do a google search for Hackers-Arise and you’ll find your way easily enough.
Also, just a quick reminder that scams are everywhere in life and on the front line of a conflict zone is no different to anywhere else in the world. Ukraine has been open with what it needs in the way of resources and where money can be legitimately donated should you chose that option.. With that said, be extremely wary of donations of any shape or form that are being solicited outside of the usual verified avenues.
So there you have it! A somewhat long article on the evolution of Cyber war in 2022/3 but one that remains interesting due to its use of technology and the ethical complications in regards to lone wolf attacks. As we stated during the initial write up much of whats occurred in this battle space is outside the scope of being easily assessed now. Like any combat situation, historians and tacticians the world over will analyze, critique and review this for many years to come. However, shining a light on it briefly now to expose some of these more interesting complications as well as giving Ukraine request for resources more air time can be done now, prior to the end of the conflict and before historians involve themselves.
And we’d be remiss writing any article touching on the European conflict without throwing in that one little line, repeated many times over the past 12 months by many people committed to the cause…..Slava Ukraini. Personally, we think liberty is at stake which for Ukraine, should mean F16’s, Tomahawks and GLSDB, preferably as quickly as possible.
Posts
Comments
Post a Comment